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  Abstract 
This essay explores how three behavior-shaping systems - legal, market, and moral - influence 
the fundamental tasks of both for-profit and nonprofit organizations, including organizational 
goal-setting; motivation of participants; and deterring and reducing abuse of power.  After 
identifying key features of these normative systems and their characteristic differences, the 
author argues that the influence of moral systems on nonprofit organizations may be 
underestimated, especially in view of their potentially unifying role with respect to all of the 
fundamental tasks.  He suggests that the prospects for effective reform of nonprofit governance 
and accountability regimes are improved when the mechanisms and effects of these moral 
systems are taken into account. 
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3 Introduction 
 
  This essay is an unapologetic thought piece.
1  It offers a framework for thinking about 
the role of value commitments in nonprofit organizations, and about key differences between 
nonprofit and for-profit corporations.  It also hypothesizes about general tendencies in the 
differential effectiveness of types of control systems across the nonprofit and for-profit world, 
and suggests a cautious approach to the development of legal controls on nonprofits. 
 
  My starting point is to distinguish among three categories of normative, or behavior-
shaping, systems in modern society:  legal, market, and moral systems.   
 
I then identify three sorts of tasks that these normative systems may perform or facilitate:  
determining goals and making them operational; positively motivating organizational 
participants and stakeholders to contribute effort and resources toward the goals; and deterring 
and reducing abuse of discretionary power by participants, especially those personnel who have 
managerial roles (e.g., directors, officers, and trustees) over an organization.   
 
My most general hypotheses are that the three normative systems have characteristically 
different strategies and techniques for carrying out or facilitating these three tasks; that their 
strategies and techniques have characteristically different costs and benefits in important 
recurring settings; and that the roles these normative systems do and ought to play in shaping 
organizations differ between the for-profit and nonprofit corporations.  Somewhat more 
                                                 
1 Thus, it speculates freely and omits citations to the many relevant sources that have influenced me.  A later draft 
will have key citations. 
4 specifically:  In paradigmatic nonprofit corporations, the moral systems are often more important 
and potentially more effective, and the legal system is often less important and less potentially 
effective, than in the case of for-profit corporations. 
 
  These opening statements are very abstract, but will be expanded and illustrated as we 
proceed. 
 
Prelude:  On the Nature of Moral Systems 
 
  It is not hard for most scholars to grasp what is meant by “legal systems” or to imagine 
their role in generating and enforcing norms or rules.  Legislators, regulators, and courts make 
rules and enforceable doctrines or principles.  Courts enforce the rules and principles as well as 
many privately created contractual obligations.  Sanctioning violators of rules and principles 
takes place, if need be, after judicial proceedings that result in state-enforceable sentences, 
judgments, or settlements.  Various state officials such as police and regulators play a role in 
monitoring compliance and detecting violations, and therefore assist in deterrence. 
 
  Similarly, market forces are easily recognized as able to enforce some kinds of norms, 
such as those created by contracts, both formal and implicit.  If a debtor fails to pay, or an 
employee or agent fails to perform well, the other party may cease to deal with the breaching 
party, and may release information about the breach to other players in the market, who may then 
refuse to deal (at least on the same terms) with the defaulting party.  In other words, a well-
functioning market can sanction norm violators by diminishing their contractual opportunities. 
5  
  But court-ordered judgments and diminished (or more costly) contracting opportunities 
are not the only sanctions that can be applied to norm violators.  Moral sanctions may also apply. 
 
  What does this mean?  Because different readers may attach very different intuitive 
pictures to such concepts as moral systems (or value commitments, etc.), I will attempt a brief 
portrayal of what is meant in this essay. 
 
  Moral sanctions for norm violations come in two forms:  social disapproval and guilt.
2  
The term “guilt” is meant to suggest a broader concept:  self-applied negative feeling that may 
operate with some force in individuals who have “internalized” a set of values that entail the 
norm in question.  Importantly, the individuals subject to the internalized norms may also have 
positive, self-reinforcing feelings when they take actions that do conform to the norms.  In most 
people the internalization of value commitments does not result solely or principally from 
independent individual reflection and reasoning, but from social processes.
3  That is, “moral 
systems” install values and norms in individuals and reinforce and maintain them. 
 
  Moral systems, as I use the term, include coherent social groups, volunteer associations, 
well-defined professions (clergy, doctors, lawyers, accountants, and the like), and religious 
groups. 
                                                 
2 Disapproval and guilt may be combined in various degrees, of course. 
3 These social processes may build on evolutionarily evolved dispositions that many people have – for example, the 
tendency to engage in spiteful retribution and impose punishment on non-reciprocators or on those who grab more 
than an equal share of collective benefits, even when punishment is on balance costly to the person imposing it.  In 
recent years, such tendencies have been much studied by game theorists in experimental settings, and evolutionary 
biologists have developed theories about them.  For my purposes, it is crucial to go further and recognize that social 
systems often augment, direct, and specify such tendencies in important ways. 
6  
 Congregations  within  the  world religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, 
Buddhism) provide the clearest and starkest examples of moral systems, so I will focus briefly on 
them.  These social groups have elaborate processes that lead to and maintain the internalization 
of norms.  At least five distinctive and practically important strategies have been identified and 
studied. 
 
(1)  Big myth strategy.  Religions ground norms in elaborate world views that themselves 
satisfy psychological needs.  They link norms to views about the origin and destiny 
of the universe (including, perhaps, a divine creator), the origin and destiny of 
humans (including, perhaps, an afterlife dependent on current norm compliance), and 
the like.  Linking norms to a much larger, explanatory mental framework makes them 
stronger and harder to change.   
 
(2)  Little myth strategy.  Religions often teach norms via sacred and vivid stories, 
histories, parables, and the like.  The basic texts of all of the world religions illustrate 
this interesting phenomenon.  Their stories – unlike, say, the judicial opinions in legal 
cases – are actually consumed by many group members (not just professionals) and 
they take advantage of cognitive-psychological phenomena like the vividness and 
availability heuristics to get themselves embedded in individual psyches. 
 
(3)  Rituals.  Religions rehearse norms and values in various and oft-repeated collective 
rituals and mass gatherings – synagogue meetings, masses, calls to prayer, 
7 pilgrimages, weddings and funerals, etc.  Religions never just announce and publish a 
rule and assume it will stick.  Their repetitive rituals take advantage of social 
facilitation processes now studied seriously by psychologists (who, to be sure, are 
often most interested in advertising and marketing applications). 
 
(4)  Devotions.  Religions also encourage focused and repeated reflection on values and 
norms.  Such focused repetition enhances commitment. 
 
(5)  Sacralization.  Religions typically declare certain texts, times, places, and persons to 
be holy or sacred, thereby putting them beyond the permitted realm of individual 
second-guessing and attempted criticism.  When successful, the technique helps 
control the disintegrating erosion of norm enforcement by individual reasoning 
(which is often self-serving) about appropriate norms and their proper application to 
individual cases. 
 
Other social systems like social clubs, voluntary associations devoted to public-interest 
causes, and the professional groups often have analogs to, or echoes of, the five strategies.  For 
this and other reasons, coherent non-religious social groups can often cause effective value 
internalization and thereby lower the marginal costs of deterring and sanctioning norm 
violations.  Their chances of success may be lower than in the case of strongly established 
religious groups, but are far from trivial. 
 
8 (Notice that even liberal legal systems have analogs to the value internalization 
techniques sketched above.  Judges wear robes, for example, and many lawyers and law 
professors tend to view the U.S. Constitution as a kind of sacred text.  Put another way, real-
world normative systems are often hybrids of the ideal-type systems I am describing.  But I 
would insist that there is a vast difference in the extent to which the various real-world normative 
systems effectively use norm-internalization techniques.  For example, legal systems probably 
tend to achieve less internalization than religious systems.) 
 
Moral systems often encourage members to contribute to the provision of public goods or 
to enhance overall group welfare by altering the distribution of wealth (e.g., by charitable 
giving).  In light of this tendency, it is no accident that the historically most salient, or classic, 
nonprofit organizations – universities, hospitals, and charities providing goods and services to 
the poor
4  – tend to have been created by religious groups, which were often the most strongly 
developed exemplars of moral systems.  In modern, more nearly secular societies, the relative 
role of other social groups with significant moral systems – for example, the teaching and 
medical professions and voluntary associations committed to public-interest-regarding 
ideological causes  -- has increased in importance.   
 
With great reluctance I will refrain from analyzing the characteristic costs and benefits of 
moral systems versus legal systems.  Doing that would require a very long book.  Perhaps it 
will suffice here to note two tendencies.  (1) Moral systems often have major marginal cost 
advantages over legal and market systems in deterring, and detecting and sanctioning, 
                                                 
4 One might also mention churches themselves, insofar as they are associations that provide individual and group 
benefits. 
9 violations of certain kinds of norms, such as those forbidding fraud and theft.  This advantage 
results from the fact that, when norms are internalized, individuals will monitor and deter or 
sanction themselves.  Similarly, acting on “gossip,” or reports about other actors who don’t 
respect group norms, and applying social sanctions such as disapproval and exclusion, are 
often cheaper and quicker than using legal processes.  (2) On the other side of the balance 
sheet, moral systems often have huge installation-and-maintenance costs, as well as serious 
negative side effects.  Religions, in particular, must pay not only for specialized professionals 
(rabbis, priests, imams, monks) as does the legal system (lawmakers, regulators, judges, 
lawyers, police), but also for the cost of repeated mass rituals and educational efforts.  
Moreover, their emphasis on sacralizing texts and authority figures may retard scientific and 
rational thought and impair flexibility in developing and adjusting norms.  At the same time, 
religious involvement may generate positive externalities (e.g., health benefits and crime 
reduction) to individuals and groups. 
 
  As these comments suggest, overall assessment of normative systems is extraordinarily 
difficult.  For purposes of this essay, the essential point is simply that moral systems may have 
genuine norm-enforcement advantages over legal and market systems in some contexts. 
 
Some Paradigmatic Examples for Analysis 
 
  In order to focus analysis somewhat, consider some hypothetical but prototypical 
examples. 
 
10   Mouse Catcher Studios, Inc. is a Delaware-incorporated for-profit corporation that 
produces movies and television shows for the mass market.  It reports to the SEC, its stock is 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange and traded by tens of thousands of investors, and it has a 
$30 billion market capitalization. 
 
  Mind Grower College is an old Massachusetts nonprofit corporation.  It has about 1500 
students, all enrolled in a B.A. program; 100 faculty, half of whom are tenured; 300 staff; and an 
$800 million endowment.  Among other things, the latter funds a considerable amount of faculty 
research in the arts, humanities, and social sciences. 
 
  Consider more briefly another pair of examples, both of which involve receiving money 
from some participants and supplying food to another group.  Harriet & Davis Fruit Co. is a for-
profit corporation that takes orders by phone or Internet to send gifts of fruit and nuts to persons 
designated by the customers.  Mother Teresa Food Bank is a nonprofit corporation that is staffed 
by some nuns and many religiously committed volunteers; it receives modest donations from 
many individuals and gives food to poor and low-income people around the world. 
 
  Admittedly, these hypotheticals are “loaded” in the sense that reflection about them may 
lead to different intuitions than would arise if one imagined other entities – for example, on the 
nonprofit side, a private family-controlled foundation, a donor advised fund, or a secular social 
services agency that receives most of its funding from the federal government.  Nevertheless, the 
examples all represent classic or prototypical organizations that are worth analysis. 
 
11 I will refer to the examples as we consider the three “tasks” that each normative system 
might carry out or facilitate. 
 
Task One:  Determine Goals 
 
  Law’s role as to the for-profit.  In the case of a publicly held for-profit corporation like 
Mouse Catcher Studios, the law makes a modest though important contribution to the explicit 
determination of its goals and output. 
 
  Although the law’s actual and ideal stance is not free from academic debate,
5 and varies 
across jurisdictions in response to lobbying by special interests, and is surprisingly mushy on 
specifics, the traditional norm – embodied, say, in the judicial heritage of Delaware, where more 
than half of publicly traded for-profit corporations are incorporated – reflects a shareholder 
primacy view that greatly facilitates the operation of both legal and market controls over 
managerial conduct. 
 
  The law’s traditional view may be restated more fully as follows: 
 
1.  It is not usually helpful to speak of a corporation’s “purpose.”  Policymakers should 
consider the total impact of corporations on social welfare, and in doing so should 
                                                 
5 There is a surprisingly recurrent academic literature debating the validity and merits of a shareholder primacy view 
versus a stakeholder model of the publicly held for-profit corporation.  In corporate boardrooms, however, the issue 
rarely arises, and shareholder primacy rules.   
12 consider their effects on all affected constituencies.  But they should consider 
directors’ duties as a separate issue. 
 
2.  In general, elected legislators (not corporate boards) are the actors who should 
attempt to structure laws so as to optimize the total impact of corporations on human 
welfare.  Doing so will involve many guesses and many kinds of laws. 
 
3.  A for-profit corporation’s directors have a fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder 
value, subject to several important constraints (items a, b, and c below) and important 
caveats (items d and e): 
 
a.  Directors may and should cause their corporation to obey the law, even when 
the risk of detection and punishment seems low. 
 
b.  Directors may and should cause their corporation to meet all of its legal 
obligations to non-shareholder constituencies, such as creditors, employees, 
suppliers, customers, taxing authorities, and so forth.
6                                                                
 
c.  Directors should cause their corporation to respond to market, social, and 
normative forces in such a way as to keep non-shareholder constituencies 
optimally involved in the corporation’s business.
7   
                                                 
6 Since legal obligations may be created in a staggering variety of ways -- by contracts, common law, 
statutes, regulations, rulings, case law interpretations, and so forth – the scope and impact of this often 
unstated caveat to the shareholder primacy viewpoint are enormous.   
 
13  
d.  Directors may cause their corporation to engage in charitable giving (which is 
authorized by statute in all states). 
 
e.  Directors may cause their corporation to cease participating in clearly and 
seriously unethical actions (e.g., genocide, apartheid), even when continuing 
them is profit maximizing and not clearly illegal under applicable law.
8   
 
 
In summary, as the legal system shapes the entire regime of laws and regulations 
applicable to corporations, it does consider the for-profit corporation’s total impact on all 
affected stakeholders and on society more generally.  As a result, such corporations are governed 
by a vast array of rules aimed at protecting customers, employees, suppliers, creditors, the local 
community, the environment, and so on.  However, the residual or open-ended goal and duty of 
the corporation’s controlling body, the board of directors, and of its top officers (CEO, COO, 
CFO, etc.), as specified by corporation law, is to maximize value for shareholders (the residual 
claimants or “owners”), subject to various constraints and caveats.
9  
                                                                                                                                                             
7 For example, directors may properly consider the problem of protecting the firm from loss of “specific 
investments,” and such considerations may lead them to grant conditions and benefits to employees that 
go beyond those legally required, so long as they judge that such actions are likely to enhance 
shareholder value.  Similar considerations may properly lead them to cause the corporation to act as a 
“good citizen” when anticipating or responding to community groups.  Since such decisions are 
genuinely matters of judgment rather than decisions to fulfill reasonably clear and fixed legal obligations, 
directors are protected by the business judgment rule when making them. 
 
8 This caveat may be called the “matters of conscience” exception.  Perhaps not all traditionalists would 
agree with including it, since it is hard to define and risks being over-expanded, but they should.   
 
9 Another caveat:  The corporation statutes of many states now have provisions saying that boards “may” consider 
the interests of non-shareholder constituencies in the context of hostile takeover attempts, or perhaps more generally.  
14  
  Thus, at the end of the day, and even in the twilight of all the constraints and caveats, the 
directors and officers of Mouse Catcher Studios must strive to maximize only one set of 
stakeholder interests, those of the shareholders.  And although the operational meaning of this 
objective can itself be debated – Are we talking about long-term or short-term shareholder value?  
Do we accept market price as the key indicator of shareholder value?  How treat shareholder sub-
groups with different time horizons and risk preferences? – the goal, as compared to the goals of 
other organizations (e.g., a legislature or a university) and their managers or fiduciaries, is 
remarkably unitary, definite, and subject to genuine external monitoring.   
 
  We will consider the law’s role, or relative lack of a role, in getting people to adopt the 
shareholder wealth-maximization goal and be positively motivated to contribute to it, in the next 
section of the paper.  For now, it is worth noting that it takes little external effort or special 
institutional design to get the relevant people to embrace this goal.  Investors in shares naturally 
like the idea that directors and officers have a duty to enhance shareholder wealth.  They also 
like the unitary and objective nature of the goal, since both of these characteristics promote 
monitoring and facilitate the application of legal and market sanctions against underperforming 
managers.  For their part, managers (meaning both the officers and the board of directors) don’t 
mind having to pursue the shareholder-value goal as their scorecard objective, so to speak, 
especially if, as is usually the case in public corporations, their pay consists partly and 
substantially of stock and options.  And other stakeholders like employees and customers may 
not like the managers’ unitary residual focus, but will usually accept if they can pursue their own 
                                                                                                                                                             
In practice, these special provisions are used as managerial shields, and are not accepted as primary managerial 
goals by either the investing community or unthreatened managers. 
15 objectives vis-à-vis the corporation by contracting, or otherwise exerting market power; or if 
they benefit from, and perhaps even influence the provision of, laws, doctrines, and institutions 
that are aimed at protection of their interests. 
 
  Law’s role as to the nonprofit.  Turn now to Mind Grower College.  The law’s role in 
determining its goals is extremely limited.  A nonprofit corporation may have whatever 
charitable or similar ultimate purposes its founders select, and the actual meaning or operational 
content of these goals is frequently reshaped, as the organization evolves, free of interference by 
the legal system. 
 
  It is not hard to see why.  If one of Mind Grower’s key goals is “to advance fundamental 
knowledge” and it attempts to achieve it by supporting “top-quality research,” there is room for 
virtually endless argument about what fundamental knowledge is and what really counts as top-
quality research.  One can foresee internal and external debate about, and continually evolving 
and changing views about, various suggested measures of fundamental knowledge and excellent 
research.  Should we judge achievement of the goal by what faculty at other colleges think of the 
research done at Mind Grower College?  If so, how do we determine and weight their views?  
(Survey results?  Actual attempts to lure Mind Grower faculty to other institutions?  Success by 
MGC in recruiting faculty from other colleges?)  Should we measure excellence by citation 
frequency? By Nobel and Pulitzer Prizes awarded to the MGC faculty?  Should we defer to the 
evaluations and rankings done by independent, field-focused groups of outside experts, or by the 
views of academic associations that also engage in accrediting the college?  What about the 
16 rankings created by news media?  What about the opinions of foundations or people in industry 
and the practicing professions?  
 
  More generally, the underlying ultimate goal of the trustees of Mind Grower College is 
farther away from objectivity and ease of monitoring than the goal of Mouse Catcher’s directors.  
And the law’s statements about mission do not give much help to the process of goal 
determination and operationalization.  Moreover, the law seems to have no easy way of 
encouraging managers to adopt Mind Grower’s “real” ultimate goal. 
 
  Finally, a similar, if not so extreme, set of observations could be made about Mind 
Grower College’s other large-scale goal of “providing a superb liberal arts education” to its 
graduates.  The meaning of this goal, and even more so the measures of its achievement, are 
highly contestable by well-meaning participants and observers. 
 
  And yet… Private nonprofit liberal arts colleges exist and often thrive.  Their goals get 
chosen and made operational.  How? 
 
  The role of market forces in goal determination?  One could attempt to alleviate the 
question just posed about Mind Grower College by resort to a market-forces analysis.  For 
whatever reasons, the analyst says, potential participants and stakeholders – potential donors, 
faculty, students, and firms that hire graduates – “have” preferences for superb liberal arts 
education and top-quality basic research that advances fundamental knowledge.  Because these 
potential participants have market power over the college – they can refuse to donate, be hired, 
17 apply or enroll, or hire graduates – the managers, because they have a self-interest in the 
college’s continuation and prosperity (officers want their jobs and pay, trustees want their power 
and prestige), will strive to make the goals operational and achieve them.  In doing so, the 
specific outputs will tend to reflect the interpretations and preferences of the participants in 
accord with their relative market power. 
 
  In this analysis, so far, the legal system supplies a modest but practically important goal 
specification to the for-profit corporation but does very little in the case of the nonprofit 
corporation.  The market, by contrast, provides strong assistance in both cases, by making 
managers responsive to the existing or legally dictated preferences of potential participants. 
 
  The role of moral systems in goal specification.  But it would be odd and unrealistic, I 
assert, to view Mind Grower College as simply “implementing” the externally found or 
exogenously “given” preferences of potential participants.  If MGC is like other established 
colleges, it contains a powerful professional class, its tenured faculty, who continually reinforce, 
amplify, reshape, and define the operational meaning of, the commitment of college participants 
toward achieving the goals of superb liberal arts education and good research that advances 
fundamental knowledge.   This group engages in a pattern of social processes and rituals that 
build, sustain, and change commitments to the goals.  The social processes are real and ongoing, 
even if hard to identify and measure.  They provide the goal specifications that the legal system 
is basically helpless to supply, and that the market system simply accepts as exogenously given. 
 
18   The example of Mother Teresa Food Bank illustrates similar points, perhaps even more 
starkly.  That organization’s goal of providing free food to the poor is directly mandated or urged 
by an identifiable moral system, and the staff and volunteers who carry it out continually 
reinforce the goal, and define it more concretely, by their ongoing work.  If functioning as 
intended, the whole organization is a moral system in action. 
 
Task Two:  Motivate Participants 
 
  The analysis is similar, though interestingly different in important ways, when one turns 
to the role of the three control systems in requiring or facilitating positive commitment to the 
organization’s goals.  How are the participants and stakeholders incentivized and motivated, and 
what roles do the normative systems play in the process?   
 
  Motivation at for-profits:  no problem?  In the for-profit case of Mouse Catcher Studios, 
market forces can operate as vigorously as they do because most participants already have a 
natural or given impulse to maximize their wealth.  As before, the market’s primary role is 
simply to run with what is given.
10
 
                                                 
10 This characterization is not entirely true, of course.  Market participants may devote substantial conscious effort 
toward augmenting, shaping, and even changing preferences.  There is, after all, a vast and successful advertising 
and marketing industry.  More interestingly, constant participation in market transactions may increase or otherwise 
affect positive motivation.  For example, it is not unrealistic to conjecture that, by engaging repeatedly in the 
practice of preparing for, performing, and/or attending quarterly earnings calls, the participating corporate officers 
and investors reinforce and even enhance their level of greed and strong focus on maximizing profits and share 
prices.  It may be more informative to analyze a preference-shaping process of this sort in psychological and 
sociological terms, by reference to classic notions of a regular “ritual” with real “functions” or by resort to more 
trendy concepts in behavioral economics.  Either way, the exercise supports the framework developed in this essay.   
19   Nor is there much apparent role in motivation at Mouse Catcher for the moral systems, if 
it is true that people are biologically predisposed to want, or to learn to want, more and more 
wealth (and power and prestige).  (True, one might alter this judgment if one could credibly 
argue for the relevance, validity, and significance of an updated version of a thesis similar to 
Max Weber’s theory of the Protestant Ethic and the rise of capitalism.  I do not mean to rule out 
the existence and importance of such background influences of the moral systems.)  
 
  The legal system also takes motivation toward wealth-maximization as basically given, 
but it also facilitates the establishment of incentives to align managerial efforts with shareholder 
wealth by its creation of mandatory disclosure systems like the securities laws.  The increased 
transparency and visibility of corporate performance helps shareholders to exercise, in the 
market and in legal forums, such disciplinary powers as they have over their supposed 
fiduciaries.  Similarly, the law plays an important role by structuring the institutional 
arrangements that give shareholders rights to vote, to sue, and to sell – all of which can result in 
significant discipline over managers who might be tempted to depart from their goal of trying to 
maximize shareholder wealth. 
 
  Motivation at nonprofits:  a mystery?  When we turn to the nonprofit context, the picture 
changes dramatically. 
 
  In the case of Mind Grower College, for example, the career-long commitments of 
faculty members to basic research and liberal arts education are undoubtedly not a mere function 
of initial preferences, but are reinforced, sustained, amplified, and shaped by social processes 
20 that keep the faculty together and connected to the rest of the higher-education teaching 
profession.  Effort is a function not only of resulting pay, but also of resulting status and 
compliance with internalized norms.  The motivating process is advanced by social/moral 
systems that assign greater prestige and status to those who sign on to, and vigorously pursue, the 
values of academia.  Not only do diligent faculty gain higher praise and status, but they also 
come to internalize academic values and pursue them more seriously as ends in themselves.  
Even the pay setters’ metrics come to be shaped in line with the faculty’s academic values.   
 
  In other words, the moral systems are vitally important to sustaining and enhancing 
motivation in nonprofits.  The point is perhaps illustrated even more forcefully and vividly by 
religious nonprofits.  The staff and volunteers who work at Mother Teresa Food Bank are 
presumably driven in significant part by a different, but strong, set of motivations than the simple 
income-earning goals that motivate the employees at Harriet & Davis Fruit Co.  The volunteers’ 
active participation in MTFB work itself undoubtedly reinforces and strengthens their 
motivation. 
 
  In the United States, of course, the legal system also plays an important role in 
motivation at nonprofits.  But unlike the moral systems’ modes of shaping preferences and 
positively increasing individual motivation, the legal system’s role is often simply facilitative.  
(That is, it gets out of the way.)  The tax deductibility of contributions to nonprofits lowers the 
economic cost of giving, though it neither eliminates that cost nor originates the impulse to give.  
The nondistribution constraint – that is, the absence of a shareholder class, which has rightfully 
been identified as a key defining feature of the nonprofit form (cf. Hansmann) – removes a major 
21 pressure to take advantage of the imperfect knowledge or bargaining power of consumers of or 
contributors to the nonprofit (e.g., students at MGC or small donors to MTFB).  More generally, 
the legal system may facilitate nonprofits by not regulating them heavily.  For some types of 
nonprofits, though, government, which is the legal system’s institutional creator, may provide 
major funding that operates as an independent positive motivator of activity.  Nevertheless, it is 
hard to imagine the nonprofit sector continuing with any degree of vibrancy apart from the 
positive motivations that are shaped and enhanced by moral systems. 
 
Task Three:  Control Abuse 
 
  In every sizable organization, whether for-profit or nonprofit, a major set of problems 
arises as an inevitable byproduct of the fundamentally desirable location of decision making 
power in directors or trustees, officers, and employees or volunteers.  These participants are 
supposed to use their power to advance organizational goals, but they may sometimes use it to 
extract improper private benefits of control.  In less detached terminology, they may engage in 
theft, fraud, unfair self-dealing, and many forms of slack.   
 
Here, at last, it appears that the legal system has a major role to play in both the nonprofit 
and the for-profit world.  But, as I shall explain, a broad overview of patterns of abuse suggests 
what might be called “the puzzle of nonprofit governance,” and the likelihood that it can be 
partly answered by consideration of the moral systems’ special role in controlling self-dealing 
and the like in nonprofits. 
 
22 Law and the for-profit.  Turn first to the legal system’s regulation of fiduciary abuse in 
the for-profit world in which Mouse Catcher Studios operates.  The legally generated norms and 
enforcement apparatus are extraordinarily elaborate, complex, expensive, and at first blush 
severe.  They may usefully be grouped under six categories. 
 
1.  There are many statutes, regulations, and doctrines prohibiting fraud.  Those 
involving fraud in financial accounting, reporting, and auditing matters are especially 
numerous and complex. 
 
2.  There are, mostly at the state level, elaborately developed and frequently applied 
judicial doctrines spelling out fiduciary duties to refrain from unfair self-dealing, 
deflection of corporate opportunities, unfair competition with one’s corporation, 
unfair action toward public or minority stockholders in change-of-control situations, 
and so on.   
 
3.  Corporate law as implemented generally gives residual claimants, the shareholders, 
the right to vote.  Most notably, shareholders can vote in, or vote out, the board of 
directors, which in most matters is the ultimate decision making authority over 
corporate affairs.  In exercising this right, shareholders may be motivated by hopes of 
better business performance with a different managerial team, but they may also vote 
in accord with their perceptions of managerial extraction of excessive private 
benefits, and may thereby sanction wrongdoers.  The right to vote leads to some of 
23 the most dramatic and salient corporate-world events – proxy fights and takeover 
contests. 
 
4.  Corporate law and the federal securities laws create elaborately developed and 
frequently used rights to sue corporate directors and officers.  Importantly, these 
rights reside in shareholders as well as in various public officials such as the 
Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission.  In the United 
States, litigation against for-profit corporations and their officers and directors is a 
major industry, as indicated by the large numbers and huge settlement amounts of 
federal securities class actions, state law-based stockholder derivative suits, and 
actions by the DOJ and SEC. 
 
5.  Shareholders have the right to sell their shares – which conveniently embody their 
whole bundle of economic rights and governance rights – and can frequently do so on 
organized and efficient markets.  Importantly for our purposes, the right to sell can act 
as a meaningful sanction against perceived abuses by corporate fiduciaries.    
Widespread selling can depress stock price, make financing and business plans harder 
for managers to achieve, and hurt officers and directors whose own compensation 
consists (as it often does) in significant part of stock, stock units, and the like.  It 
might also pave the way for hostile takeover bids that could also act as severe 
sanctions on the fiduciaries. 
 
24 6.  The federal securities laws provide elaborate mandatory disclosure rules that facilitate 
the operation of the sanctioning mechanisms identified in items 3, 4, and 5 (rights to 
vote, sue, and sell), and thereby greatly enhance the importance and value of those 
mechanisms. 
 
(An aside on market forces.)  Note that many of the legal system’s impositions, such as 
the elegant structural rules that make the shareholder’s right to sell shares so tidy and efficient, 
may be characterized as ways of facilitating market sanctions against violations of implied 
contracts and fiduciary duties. The legal and market systems work hand in hand, and both seem 
on their face to be very powerful.
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Law and the nonprofit.  Consider now the law’s role in controlling abuse by fiduciaries in 
nonprofits.  The principles and enforcement mechanisms in this context are also multiple and 
complex (cf. Fremont-Smith 2004), but they differ in some fundamental ways. 
 
1.  There are statutes and doctrines against fraud by such fiduciaries, although they are 
not as elaborately spelled out as in the case of for-profit corporations.   
 
2.  Both nonprofit corporation law and trust law (which applies to some nonprofits) 
impose well-developed fiduciary duties on the trustees and officers of nonprofits.  
These duties are similar in scope and coverage to those applied to directors and 
                                                 
11 A related point is that some market participants, such as shareholders, are directly hurt by fiduciary misconduct 
and have a natural incentive to administer sanctions, so long as they can do so at acceptable cost and can expect a 
recovery, or avoid additional loss, or achieve some other end.  But the market left to itself may not supply sufficient 
knowledge about violations or tools for administering sanctions; both the legal and moral systems can step in on 
these fronts.   
25 officers of for-profits.  In some respects they may be stricter, and they cover some 
additional problems.  But the case law developing their concrete meanings and 
applications, and litigation involving them, are much less voluminous than in the for-
profit world, in part because of the differences pointed out in the next several items.   
 
3.  Rights to vote on the identity of trustees are less prevalent, more limited, and 
significantly less important than in the for-profit world.  There is no single class of 
residual claimants who have both the right to vote and a strong incentive to use it 
wisely.  Intended beneficiaries usually don’t have the voting power.  At Mind Grower 
College, for example, neither the students nor the general (much less future) public 
that is supposed to benefit (eventually) from the research that advances fundamental 
knowledge, vote on the election of trustees.  Nor do the tenured faculty, which is 
otherwise the de facto ruling class.  Alumni and alumnae, who may include 
significant donors, might have such a right, but incentives to participate are weak, and 
in some of the classic and best nonprofit institutions (e.g., Harvard), even they may be 
formally excluded, because the ultimate governing body (the board – called “the 
Corporation” at Harvard) is formally self-perpetuating – it has the right to elect its 
own successors.  Needless to say, the severely stunted voting rights given to 
participants in nonprofits like Mind Grower College means that there is less room for 
analogs of the for-profit world’s proxy contests and takeover battles.  The voting 
sanction over nonprofit fiduciaries seems vastly weaker than in the for-profit world.   
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for-profit world.  State attorneys general can sue, but their resources and interest in 
doing so are significantly smaller than those available to the DOJ and the SEC (which 
watch over for-profits but historically have had much smaller roles in policing 
nonprofits).  The Internal Revenue Service has regulatory power and may act to 
remove the tax exemptions of charities violating prohibitions against private benefit 
and private inurement, or to impose intermediate sanctions (excise taxes) on 
designated power-wielding participants who receive or willfully approve “excess 
benefits” from charities.  But most importantly for our comparative analysis, intended 
beneficiaries have no ability to bring the equivalent of shareholder derivative suits 
and securities class actions.  (This pattern may be about to change somewhat, of 
course.)  Even the rights of donors are relatively limited, to enforcement of their 
particular arrangements with the nonprofit.  Consequently, in the nonprofit world 
there is nothing like the sub-sector of plaintiff law firms that sustain the giant 
litigation industry focused on publicly held for-profit corporations.    
 
5.  Rights to sell residual interests in nonprofits simply do not exist.  Granted, various 
participants may choose to exit:  good students can stop enrolling at Mind Grower 
College, donors can stop giving, and so on.  These possibilities can discipline 
managers.  But the exiting participants do not sell others rights that permit the 
equivalent of a hostile takeover.  
 
27 6.  There are mandatory disclosure rules applicable to nonprofit corporations, but they 
are limited and cannot begin to compare in coverage, specificity, and consequence to 
the regime applicable to for-profit corporations.  (To test the point, see if you can 
find, on a governmentally funded website similar to the SEC’s Edgar system, the 
equivalent for Mind Grower College of the annual 10-Ks, the quarterly 10-Qs, and 
the numerous 8-Ks filed, and available to anyone on earth with web access, for 
Mouse Catcher Studios.)  Nor are auditing standards and internal control 
requirements, such as those now governed by the infamous section 404 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, so highly developed as in the case of for-profits.  The same may 
be said for explicit statutory requirements and statutes criminalizing specific conduct 
involving presentation of financial results.  They are more elaborately developed in 
the for-profit world. 
 
To summarize:  Although general legal principles constraining fraud and self-dealing by 
fiduciaries are similar and roughly comparable in the for-profit and nonprofit worlds, there is a 
dramatic difference in the availability and potency of legally shaped sanctioning mechanisms  -- 
that is, the rights of participants and others to vote, to sue, and to sell or exit in a way that has 
punishing consequences – and in the development of mandatory disclosure regimes that might 
enable and facilitate sanctioning efforts.  In the nonprofit world, the sanctioning mechanisms and 
disclosure regimes seem much weaker. 
 
Note also that market forces are unlikely to “make up the difference.”    Quite the 
opposite is true:  Precisely because the goals and achievements of nonprofits like Mind Grower 
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objective, and readily monitored goal of a for-profit corporation like Mouse Catcher Studios, 
market forces seem less likely to detect and sanction fiduciary misconduct.  This point seems 
especially valid when the question is ability to detect and sanction organizational slack  -- since 
slack in nonprofits can often be portrayed by the relevant professional class as “really” being an 
indicator of quality (consider, for example, low student-faculty ratios in a college)  -- but it even 
extends, I would argue, to other forms of self-dealing and extraction of private benefits. 
 
The puzzle of nonprofit governance.  In light of the points made about legal and market 
controls in the prior two sections, one might expect the relative prevalence and severity of 
fiduciary misconduct to be vastly greater in nonprofit corporations than in for-profit 
corporations. 
 
  But precisely the opposite appears to be the case.  The long history of media accounts 
suggests that nonprofit enterprises seem to be much less afflicted with scandals stemming from 
managerial misconduct than is the case with respect to for-profit business enterprises.  This 
impression appears to hold even when one adjusts for the relative sizes of the two sectors.  There 
are some good media surveys of nonprofits that do indicate troubling instances of fiduciary 
misconduct in some nonprofit organizations. (Gibelman & Gelman 2001; cf. ALI Discussion 
Draft 2006, passim.)  But the scale and frequency of misconduct they reveal seem to pale in 
comparison to the recurring reports of scandals erupting in the for-profit world -- for example, 
the arresting instances of financial manipulation and blatant self-dealing that came to light in 
scandals involving Enron, Worldcom, Tyco, Royal Dutch Shell, Parmalat, and numerous other 
29 companies during the stock market downturn at the beginning of this decade.  Similarly, there is 
occasional outrage at the excessive pay obtained by a few university presidents or other leaders 
of nonprofits, but the amounts and their prevalence seem almost pathetic when put against the 
data underlying the ongoing and intense, but so far ineffective, criticism of CEO pay packages at 
publicly held for-profit corporations.   
 
To accentuate the riddle a bit, consider an additional perspective and impression.  
Looking at the long sweep of history, it appears that larger nonprofits tend to have a longer life 
span than large for-profit corporations.  Try, for example, to name some large for-profit 
corporations that have lasted as long as Harvard College or the Massachusetts General Hospital.  
The longevity might suggest that such nonprofits have survival-promoting structural 
characteristics (“good corporate genes”).  How can this be true, in view of the pathetic weakness 
of legally shaped sanctioning mechanisms that might control managerial misconduct in the 
nonprofits? 
 
Some approaches to the puzzle.  There are a variety of obvious approaches to attempting 
resolution of the puzzle just presented, and each may have some merit.  My interest here is in 
proposing that efficacious moral systems should be considered a strong explanatory factor. 
 
One approach to the puzzle is to simply question impressions, ask for good data, and hold 
on to the possibility that there is every bit as much (or even more) fiduciary misconduct in 
nonprofits as in for-profits.  A variation on this approach might be called the hidden evil 
hypothesis:  precisely because the law imposes less severe disclosure requirements and fewer 
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to light.  My guess is that there is some merit to this approach, but that it would not begin to fully 
resolve the puzzle.  Even in the absence of easily invoked legal sanctioning mechanisms, there 
are many individuals – journalists, investigators, busybodies, internal whistle blowers, aggrieved 
former employees, etc. – whose lives give them access to scandalous information about 
managerial conduct in nonprofits and who could get personal satisfaction from revealing it to the 
media and others.  It is hard to imagine a vast pattern of high-level scandalous conduct going 
undiscovered for decades. 
 
A second approach to resolution of the puzzle is to critique and discredit the particular 
design and effectiveness of the legally shaped control mechanisms that are available in the for-
profit world.  The application to the puzzle would be to then suggest that there is therefore no 
good reason to suppose that the apparently more powerful legal controls over for-profit managers 
will make a real difference in their self-seeking behavior. 
 
For example, various legal scholars claim that shareholder voting power results only 
rarely in displacement of entrenched and suboptimal boards, and there are identifiable (and 
potentially remediable) reasons why this is so (Bebchuk); that shareholder derivative actions are 
afflicted with their own agency problems and have no proven relationship with shareholder value 
(Romano); that hostile takeovers have declined in significance since the 1980s, in part, it seems, 
because of identifiable and measurable structural obstacles allowed by law (Coates, Bebchuk, & 
Subramanian; others); and so on.    
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critiques and the supporting empirical studies, yet still be incredulous of the proposition that, in 
the aggregate, the legal and market controls do not have very significant force in reducing 
managerial misconduct in the for-profit world.  That is, the legal and market controls may be 
materially suboptimal, but they seem very far from trivial.  So an attempted solution to the 
puzzle that is solely along this path is likely to be incomplete.  (Moreover, an effort to fully 
discredit legal controls would require a very long journey, with a nontrivial risk of getting lost in 
a methodological wilderness.) 
 
Moreover, even if the inefficacy in practice of apparently useful legal controls could 
explain a lack of difference in fiduciary misconduct rates between for-profits and nonprofits, it 
would not explain why the rate appears to be lower in the nonprofits.   
 
One could also attack the puzzle of nonprofit governance by identifying mechanisms and 
forces that lead to reduction of managerial misconduct in nonprofits, but which are different in 
type than those that scholars and policymakers usually think about in the for-profit setting.  This 
thought leads to what might be called the third way:  recognizing the real-world importance of 
moral systems. 
 
Consider, for example the role of reputation and social sanctions.  It may well be that board 
members of nonprofits are much more interested in how others in their relevant social set 
will perceive them as board members than in any pecuniary or “junket-type” benefits of 
service, that information about board service gets around, and that social sanctions for 
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and effective. 
 
But perhaps the more promising avenue is to investigate the force of internalized moral 
commitments on the behavior of those who tend to devote themselves to leadership of 
nonprofits (or to volunteer efforts, or to higher-level and professional staff positions in 
nonprofits).  As suggested in the prelude of this essay, “moral” commitments may stem from 
a variety of socially facilitated sources.  These include (a) religious beliefs, such as those 
held by the founders and operators of early-era nonprofit hospitals and redistribution-oriented 
charities like the Salvation Army, (b) “public interest” world views, such as the save-our-
endangered-environment views espoused by active leaders of environmentally oriented 
nonprofits, or the ‘knowledge for its own sake” or “knowledge for the greater long-range 
good” ideologies of many academics, and (c) commitments based on sympathy, compassion, 
and socially amplified altruistic impulses, such as those that animate foundations which 
support medical research for vividly unfortunate medical conditions.  It may be, then, that the 
key to the puzzle is to expand reasoning about human nature beyond economic reasoning in 
its narrower manifestations.  Ideology and internalized control mechanisms (“conscience”) 
are important factors in human behavior, and policy makers should seek to study and 
understand when they are and are not present and how they are channeled, strengthened, and 
weakened by the operation of particular psychological and social variables.  Research into 
such matters should be central to the work of scholars concerned about nonprofit governance 
and accountability. 
 
33 Some Obvious Questions 
 
  The hypothesis that moral systems can be forcefully operative in certain organizations 
raises at least three further questions that require comment. 
 
 (1)  Don’t moral systems operate in for-profits too?  First, supposing that moral systems 
can be importantly effective in controlling fiduciary misconduct in some corporations, why 
would there be a difference between nonprofit and for-corporations in the frequency and power 
of their influence?  Can’t moral systems operate in for-profits too? 
 
  The answer is that they can and do operate in for-profits, but are not as likely to be salient 
and additively effective amid legal and market controls.  Why?  In part because, as explained 
above, in nonprofits the moral systems are heavily involved in the organization’s essential 
processes of determining goals and motivating key employees to work harder and better.  Moral 
control of potential misconduct is intertwined with, indeed part of, existing important social 
processes in the organization.  The moral system operates in an integrated fashion to pursue all 
three key tasks.  It is thus more likely that norms about promoting organizational welfare become 
internalized and partially self-enforcing.  In any event, such norms may be more likely to be 
enforced by social sanctions inside nonprofit organizations.  (We might call the argument in this 
paragraph the integration thesis.)   
 
  By contrast, in for-profits the goal (shareholder value maximization) is externally set and 
not one promoted heavily by moral systems.  (Ken Lay of Enron went to church services, but it is 
34 unlikely that his minister preached the sublime virtues of maximizing shareholder value.)  
Motivation to work toward the profit-maximizing goal is provided by pay arrangements and 
market forces.  Moral systems external to the corporation may train participants to feel that fraud 
and theft against people or entities toward which one is in a position of trust are wrong, but these 
injunctions are not thereby rehearsed, specified, drilled in, facilitated by group processes, 
bolstered by social sanctions, or linked to an overarching world view, in the social processes of 
the corporation itself.  As a consequence, truly moral individuals may continue to be so when 
acting as corporate fiduciaries, and may properly translate their general moral self-constraints 
into correct specific principles of action inside the corporation (instead of, say, rationalizing 
selfish actions, which can happen easily in some contexts, such as diversion of corporate 
opportunities or trading on inside information).  But there is likely to be some slippage because 
the morality-reinforcing processes are not so institutionally embedded in the organization as they 
are in many classic nonprofits.  In the for-profit corporation, there is a lack of integration of the 
three tasks of specifying goals, motivating participants, and controlling abuse, and this non-
integration suggests an absence of mutual reinforcement of the three tasks.
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 (2)  Can law enhance morals?  Assuming that moral systems are especially strong and 
effective in some nonprofits, it seems clear, as an empirical matter, that this is not always true 
and that their effectiveness varies greatly across nonprofit organizations.  One is then tempted to 
wonder whether the legal system can effectively require, enhance, facilitate, or at least reward 
and select for, nonprofit corporations that have well-functioning moral systems. 
                                                 
12 A related obvious question, both here and throughout my analysis, is whether the empirical evidence indicates that 
value commitments matter more in nonprofits.  Empirical work on the behavior and performance of nonprofits as 
compared to for-profits is very incomplete, imperfect, and difficult to interpret in the aggregate, but it does at least 
appear to be consistent with an altruistic model of nonprofits.  (Malani, Philipson, & David 2003) 
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  It would be socially good if such strategies were feasible, but this author is not aware of 
tested tactics that would actually work and be cost-effective.  This skepticism in reinforced by 
certain scholars in the behavioral law and economics movement who embrace and document the 
reality and power of social norms but who also analyze the multiple difficulties faced by 
lawmakers who might want to leverage or make use of social norm-making and norm–enforcing 
processes.  (E.g., Rachlinski, Scott, various others.) 
 
 (3)  Shouldn’t legal controls over nonprofits be strengthened anyway?  Assume the 
existence and importance in some (or many) nonprofits of effective moral systems that work to 
control abuse by fiduciaries.  Does that fact provide any reason not to toughen or enhance legal 
controls over fiduciary misconduct in ways currently being proposed and considered (e.g., by the 
American Law Institute)?  Wouldn’t more be better?  And isn’t tougher legal regulation called 
for by the twin facts that fiduciary misconduct does occur in the nonprofit world and that many 
nonprofits (and, indeed, some subcategories of nonprofits) appear not to have effectively 
functioning embedded systems of moral control? 
 
  Perhaps surprisingly, there are at least two general reasons for caution.  One is that 
tougher legal regulation may create more costs than benefits.  This risk seems especially worth 
study and analysis when proposed new rules are being transplanted from the for-profit world but 
are already seriously criticized as cost-ineffective there.  Two vivid examples are the strict 
corporate governance arrangements mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the shareholder 
derivative suit.  Numerous empirically oriented scholars have raised severe doubts about the 
36 cost-effectiveness of these arrangements, and although there are opposing voices too, it seems 
risky to transplant such arrangements to the nonprofit world, where monitoring is intrinsically 
more difficult and incentives to invoke sanctioning mechanism are intrinsically more diffuse and 
not necessarily granted to the right persons. 
 
  A more subtle reason for caution is the possibility that explicit legal rules and sanctioning 
mechanisms may tend to “crowd out” and displace moral norms and sanctions, making them less 
effective.  Some legal scholars writing about social norms (e.g., Dan Kahan) have developed this 
theme in more general law-enforcement contexts like tax collection and prevention of littering.  
They may have a valid point, and it might be applicable in the context of the nonprofit 
corporation.  (I myself have no firm view about the prevalence or seriousness of such crowding 
out risks.  I do believe the problem should be studied and debated in the nonprofit context.) 
 
Conclusion 
 
  This essay has suggested a model of key differences between prototypical nonprofit and 
for-profit corporations.   
 
  As to the for-profit corporation, moral systems may contribute to task three, that of 
controlling abuse of discretionary power by fiduciaries, by supplying participants who are less 
disposed to engage in fraud, self-dealing, or other modes of extracting improper personal 
benefits.  But the moral systems play relatively little role in the two tasks of goal determination 
37 and positive motivation.  Those tasks are advanced by individuals’ natural desires for wealth and 
facilitated by institutional arrangements (which laws and markets shape). 
 
  In the classic nonprofit corporation, by contrast, moral systems play an essential and 
integrated role in all three tasks:  determining goals, motivating participants, and controlling 
abuse.  This integration of functions, it is postulated, may contribute to the effectiveness with 
which the tasks are carried out.  It may help to explain the legal system’s somewhat reduced role 
in the regulation of nonprofits as opposed to for-profits.  And although the difference certainly 
does not imply that legal regulation should be abandoned, or that efforts to improve the legal 
regulation of nonprofits should not be pursued earnestly and thoughtfully (cf. Fremont-Smith 
2006), it does suggest caution. 
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